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I am grateful to the editors of Reviews in Anthropology for giving me the opportunity
to respond to Emily Schultz’s review (2010) of my book Beyond the Hoax: Science,
Philosophy and Culture (2008). I shall begin by briefly correcting several of Schultz’s
misrepresentations of my ideas. I shall then endeavor to address the intellectually
interesting issues that she raises.
1) Schultz (2010:322) cites me (2008:123) as quoting Donna Haraway as follows:
For the complex or boundary objects in which I am interested . . . dimensions
implode . . . they collapse into each other . . . story telling . . . is a fraught practice
. . . In no way is story telling opposed to materiality, [sic] But materiality itself
is tropic; it makes us swerve, it trips us; it is a knot of the textual, technical,
mythic/oneric [sic], organic, political and economic.
She then takes me to task by observing that
the cited passage is riddled with ellipses. To be sure, Sokal links up subjects,
verbs and objects, but the significance of their linkage is muddled because an
unknown amount of potentially vital surrounding text has been excised.
The trouble is, the ellipses for which Schultz berates me are her own creation! In my
book I quote the entire paragraph from Haraway (1994:63), without omitting even a
single word, as follows:
For the complex or boundary objects in which I am interested, the mythic, tex-
tual, technical, political, organic, and economic dimensions implode. That is,
they collapse into each other in a knot of extraordinary density that constitutes
the objects themselves. In my sense, story telling is in no way an ‘art practice’ —
it is, rather, a fraught practice for narrating complexity in such a field of knots
or black holes. In no way is story telling opposed to materiality. But materiality
itself is tropic; it makes us swerve, it trips us; it is a knot of the textual, technical,
mythic/oneiric, organic, political, and economic. [2008:123]
I would like to think that this gross misquotation is honest error, not fraudulent
misrepresentation. But it is nevertheless a rather astonishing feat for a reviewer who
presumably had a copy of my book in front of her as she composed her review.
2) More generally, Schultz claims repeatedly that my analytical method consists
of “ripping individual passages or sentences from the texts in which they appear and
holding them up to ridicule” (2010:314). But the only concrete example she gives of
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such a method is the mangled quotation from Haraway. She never mentions my detailed
and respectful analyses of some key ideas from the work of Carolyn Merchant, Sandra
Harding and Evelyn Fox Keller (119–129), Barry Barnes and David Bloor (203–211),
and Bruno Latour (211–216), in which I explain my disagreements with their theses
and my view of the kernels of truth in their contentions. Schultz could of course rightly
observe that these analyses do not refute the entire œuvre of the authors in question,
and I have never claimed that they do. But it would have been more interesting had
Schultz actually addressed my arguments, rather than claiming falsely that I have none.
3) Schultz observes correctly that my book contains many footnotes, “sometimes
taking up more space [on the page] than the main text” (2010:323). It seems to me
that footnotes are a useful way of conveying subsidiary qualifications or interesting but
dispensable digressions, without bogging down the main text; and it also goes without
saying that each reader is free to like or dislike this style. But Schultz falsely claims
that the footnotes represent recent amendments to previously published essays, con-
descendingly concluding (in one typical case) that my “understanding of the meaning
of Collins’s statement has become more nuanced over time” (2010:324). In fact, the
footnote she cites (152n9 and 230n3) was present in the versions of these essays orig-
inally written in 1997 and 2001 (Sokal 1998:19n9, Sokal and Bricmont 2004:18n3), as
Schultz could easily have verified by typing a few words into Google Books. More fun-
damentally, her complaint with this footnote is bizarre, and in flat contradiction with
her contention that my main method is “ridicule”. Sociologist of science Harry Collins
(1981:3) made the rather astonishing assertion that “the natural world has a small
or non-existent role in the construction of scientific knowledge”. Rather than simply
pointing out the manifest falsity of this statement when the words in it are given their
natural and unambiguous meanings, I bent over backwards in the footnote to come up
with some charitable interpretations of what Collins might be trying inarticulately to
say. Likewise for the footnote (237n28) concerning Quine’s radical-sounding assertion
that “any statement can be held true come what may” (Quine 1980:43) — a footnote
that Schultz labels as “anxious” but which could equally well be described as “bending
over backwards to be generous”.
4) Schultz snootily dismisses my examination of postcolonial and Hindu-nationalist
conceptions of science (297–321) as “twenty pages of sound-bite analysis” (2010:326)
— a clever put-down, to be sure, but one that she does not deign to substantiate with
any precise criticisms. I leave it to readers to judge my arguments for themselves.
More importantly, Schultz chastises me for allegedly “evaluating the views of scholars
and theorists not on their own merits, but according to the purported ease with which
they give aid and comfort to the enemy” (2010:326). This would be a valid criticism
were that indeed my method, but in fact I say quite explicitly the exact opposite:
Of course, if a theory is supported by cogent reasoning or persuasive empirical
evidence, then it is unfair to criticize it on the grounds that it may lead, in some
people’s hands, to bad consequences; rather, it is the misuse of a valid idea that
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should be criticized instead. But if a doctrine is based on sloppy reasoning —
as I believe postmodernism is261 — then it is not out of place to observe that it
can also have pernicious consequences. [2008:343]1,2
My next and primary task should now be to address Schultz’s substantive criticisms
of my book. The trouble is, there are none to speak of: Schultz does not address —
much less refute — any of the principal arguments that I make in any part of my book.
There is only a confused comment concerning Quinean underdetermination (2010:325)
and an even more bizarre paragraph seguing from Ashis Nandy to interdisciplinarity
(2010:336–7).3 This is a shame: I would very much welcome rigorous criticism of my
arguments concerning epistemology, pseudoscience and religion. But that, alas, will
have to await another review and another reviewer.
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